MOSCOW, Russia has offered to host talks between Ethiopia and Eritrea as tensions between the two neighbors escalate toward what analysts describe as a potential full-scale war, with Moscow proposing the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit in late October as a venue for dialogue.
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alimov told Russia’s Izvestia newspaper that Moscow is “ready to provide a platform for organizing contacts between their representatives in order to find compromise solutions,” including at the third Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for October 28-29 in Moscow. He expressed hope that both Ethiopia and Eritrea would take advantage of the opportunity.
Alimov said the deterioration of relations between the two countries is a source of concern for Russia, which considers both nations long-standing and reliable partners. The Russian diplomat called on both sides to exercise restraint, strengthen confidence-building measures, and resolve their differences through dialogue and diplomacy.
Eritrea Accuses Abiy of Pursuing War for Sea Access
Eritrea’s Information Minister, Yemane Gebremeskel, has accused Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of waging a war of aggression against Eritrea, arguing that Ethiopia’s pursuit of direct Red Sea access poses a threat to Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Gebremeskel cited remarks Abiy made to parliament in October 2023, in which the Ethiopian leader stated his intention to secure “sovereign access to the sea, through negotiations if possible and by force if necessary.” Eritrea views this as a direct threat to its port of Assab and a pretext for territorial expansion.
In a letter to the UN Security Council, Eritrea requested that the council “forcefully condemn Ethiopia’s deplorable declaration of war against Eritrea” and take “requisite deterrent measures” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Eritrea’s Foreign Minister, Osman Saleh, warned that the Ethiopian action would cause “huge devastation to the peoples of both countries and destabilize the whole region.”
Ethiopia responded with its own letter to the Security Council, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter and accusing Eritrea of deploying infantry and mechanized units across the border and supporting, financing, arming, and directing insurgent groups. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos described Eritrea’s actions as “a blatant act of aggression that engages Ethiopia’s inherent right to self-defence.”
Ethiopia’s Naval Expansion and the Red Sea Gambit
The crisis is rooted in Ethiopia’s determination to re-establish a naval presence and secure direct access to the Red Sea, a goal that has intensified under Abiy’s government. Ethiopia lost its coastline when Eritrea gained independence in 1993, and the country has repeatedly insisted that its “legitimate interests” in the Red Sea must be recognized.
Ethiopia’s naval chief, Deputy Admiral Kindu Gezu, has acknowledged that the country’s naval force is being expanded from “zero,” with investments in training, infrastructure, and specialized combat units aimed at protecting national interests and responding to security challenges. The naval expansion comes as Ethiopia seeks to position itself as a maritime player in the Red Sea, despite not having a direct coastline.
As reported in FTL Somalia’s coverage of Abiy’s Red Sea strategy, the Ethiopian Prime Minister has explicitly linked durable peace in the Horn of Africa to Ethiopia obtaining direct sea access, arguing that the absence of ports restricts the country’s economic expansion and international competitiveness.
The Somaliland Option
Despite its naval ambitions and its January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland that reportedly traded possible recognition for coastal access, Ethiopia has stopped short of formal recognition. The reason, according to Ethiopia’s Ambassador to Israel, Tesfaye Yetayeh Anteneh, is the risk of triggering a security collapse in Somalia.
“The moment, for example, Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland, the Somali government will request Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from Somalia,” Anteneh said in an interview with i24NEWS. “And Al-Shabaab will get a free ride to attack both Somalia and Somaliland, even a spillover effect will come also to Ethiopia”.
The ambassador described recognition as “a very delicate issue” and said Ethiopia “shouldn’t rush” into a decision that could unravel the security arrangement that keeps Ethiopian troops deployed in Somalia under the African Union mission. Ethiopia has been a central troop contributor in Somalia since 2006 and currently serves in the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which began operating in January 2025.
Anteneh’s explanation reveals a strategic calculation that treats recognition less as a question of principle than as a sequencing problem. Ethiopia wants sea access. It sees Somaliland as a potential pathway. But it also depends on cooperation with Mogadishu to maintain its military presence and combat Al-Shabaab. Recognition, at this juncture, would jeopardize that cooperation without guaranteeing the benefits.
Somaliland’s ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Hagi, rejected this reasoning, arguing that recognition would strengthen Ethiopia’s security rather than undermine it, and that Mogadishu’s growing alignment with Ethiopia’s rivals posed a greater strategic threat.
Somalia’s Parallel Fear: The Same Threat, A Different Border
Eritrea’s alarm over Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions is not unique. Somalia shares the same fundamental fear, having already experienced what Eritrea now anticipates. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, the breakaway region Somalia considers its territory, granting Addis Ababa access to a 20-kilometer coastal strip at the port of Berbera for 50 years in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
Somalia rejected the agreement as a “blatant violation” of its sovereignty. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud described the deal as “nothing more than annexing part of Somalia to Ethiopia, and changing the borders of Somalia.” A Somali diplomat, speaking privately, put it more starkly: “This is not a port deal. This is a question of our existence as a nation.”
As reported in FTL Somalia’s coverage of Ethiopia’s Somaliland strategy, Addis Ababa has carefully positioned itself to move toward recognition without becoming diplomatically isolated. But the ambassador’s recent remarks suggest that the calculation is more complex than a simple trade of recognition for port access.
The Ankara Declaration, brokered by Türkiye in December 2025, eased the immediate crisis by reaffirming both countries’ commitment to each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while acknowledging Ethiopia’s interest in reliable sea access through commercial arrangements under Somali sovereignty. But the underlying tension remains unresolved. President Mohamud has said Somalia is open to Ethiopia using Somali ports, but only through direct negotiations with Mogadishu and under Somali sovereignty.
For Somalia, the Eritrea-Ethiopia crisis is therefore not a distant dispute. It is a mirror image of its own confrontation with Addis Ababa, playing out on a different border. Eritrea’s accusation that Ethiopia is pursuing war to secure sea access echoes Mogadishu’s own experience with the Somaliland MoU. And Eritrea’s warning that Ethiopia’s actions could “destabilize the whole region” is a warning Somalia has already lived through.
The Alamein Coalition and Its Fractures
The Eritrea-Ethiopia standoff directly affects Somalia because both countries are signatories to the El Alamein Joint Declaration, signed on October 4, 2026, by Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia. That declaration formalized coordination on regional security, affirmed respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and stated that the management of the Red Sea is a responsibility exclusive to its littoral states.
As reported in FTL Somalia’s coverage of the standoff, two of Somalia’s four partners in that declaration are now on the brink of war with each other, fracturing a coalition that was designed to present a united front against Ethiopian regional ambitions and Israeli recognition of Somaliland.
The declaration explicitly rejected recognition of Somaliland and affirmed that Red Sea governance is the exclusive responsibility of littoral states, a provision clearly aimed at Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. But with Eritrea and Ethiopia now exchanging accusations of aggression, the coalition’s ability to act collectively is severely compromised. Somalia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Mohamed Ali Nadar has said Mogadishu remains neutral in the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, maintaining relations with both countries and supporting peaceful solutions.
That neutrality is pragmatic but precarious. Somalia has cultivated close relationships with both Egypt and Eritrea, viewing them as partners in its own domestic security appratus. But Somalia also relies on Ethiopia for security cooperation and troop contributions to the African Union mission. The prospect of an Ethiopia-Eritrea war places Mogadishu in an impossible position, forced to choose between regional partners whose conflict it cannot influence.
Critical Note
Russia’s offer to mediate is a diplomatic gesture that reflects Moscow’s desire to remain relevant in the Horn of Africa, where it has cultivated relationships with both Addis Ababa and Asmara. But mediation requires willing parties, and neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea has publicly accepted the offer or indicated readiness to compromise on the core issue: Ethiopia’s demand for Red Sea access and Eritrea’s determination to defend its sovereignty.
The deeper problem is that the Eritrea-Ethiopia crisis is not a bilateral dispute that can be resolved through talks in Moscow. It is a structural collision between Ethiopia’s landlocked geography and its great-power ambitions, on one hand, and Eritrea’s insistence on the inviolability of its borders, on the other. Russia can provide a venue. It cannot provide a solution.
For Somalia, the crisis is both a warning and a mirror. The Alamein Declaration was signed less than three weeks ago. Two (Eritrea an Sudan) of its signatories are now publicly throwing accusations. Somalia’s own confrontation with Ethiopia over the Somaliland MoU remains unresolved, and the same logic that drives Eritrea’s fears drives Mogadishu’s. Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access has already destabilized one border in the Horn. It now threatens to destabilize another. The Ethiopian ambassador’s explanation for why recognition is on hold is a reminder that Addis Ababa’s restraint is tactical, not principled. It depends on the costs of recognition remaining high. Somalia’s diplomatic strategy of aligning with Egypt and Eritrea against Ethiopian expansionism is understandable, but it depends on partners who are themselves locked in conflict. In the Horn of Africa, partnerships are provisional, and the only constant is the region’s capacity for sudden, destabilizing change.
Share your story. FTL Somalia is continuing to follow the Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis and its implications for the Horn of Africa. If you have information or insights to share, contact us at info@ftlsomalia.com. Your identity will be protected.
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